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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
11- Case No. 19053 
,,J,1YNt: STERLING PEARSON 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Wayne Sterling Pearson, was charged by 
information with violations of the following provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. ( 1953), as amended: 76-4-201, conspiracy to 
commit attempted burglary, attempted robbery, and attempted 
theft; 76-4-101 and § 76-6-202, attempted burglary: 
76-4-101 and § 76-6-301, attempted robbery; 
76-4-101 and § 76-6-404, attempted theft. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury in the Third 
Judicial District, the Honorable David B. Dee, presiding. The 
only charges sent to the jury for determination were attempted 
burglary and attempted robbery. Appellant was convicted of 
those charges and sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison 
of not more than 5 years for each offense, the sentence to run 
concurrently with the sentence already beinq served fnr 
another offense. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPF:AL 
Respondent seeks an order affirrninq the judqm•·nt ,.f 
the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the morning of October 15, l'lfll. two juveniles, 
Brian Moss and Tony Sisneros, skipped school and headed for 
the corner of 15th South and 4th F:ast, where they were to meet 
someone for the purpose of engaging in a burglary and/or 
robbery, ( R. 577, 590-593). There they were picked up by 
Robert Smith, a co-defendant of appellant's, who had 
approached Brian Moss several weeks earlier about 
participating in a robbery involving money and jewelry 
(R. 982-988, 595-597). Moss had discussed the arrangement with 
his friend, Sisneros, who then agreed to participate in the 
planned robbery (R. 592). 
After being picked up by Smith, the boys were driven 
to a gas station at 5th East and 21st South, where they were 
joined by appellant. During the ensuing conversation among 
the four, appellant asked the boys if they needed gloves. He 
then went to his car and returned with a roll of duct tape and 
gloves (R. 599-600, 1003-1004). 
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The four individuals left the gas station in Smith's 
,·.11 anrl ,Jrove to Moss's home. During the ride, there was some 
•J''neral conversation concerning the robbery and the need for a 
'""'', l\pparently, Moss was to find something at his home that 
he> userl as a mask. One of the adults told him that a 
«/l<>» st0cking would be sufficient (R. 600-602). 
When Moss rejoined the group after a brief stop at 
his house, appellant said he needed to stop at his brother's 
apartment at 28th South and 2nd East. During the drive, there 
was more general conversation about the robbery 
(R. 1014-1016). At the apartment, appellant left the group 
for a few minutes. While appellant was gone, Smith told the 
hoys where to look and what to look for in the house they 
intended to burglarize. He also told the boys that if any 
trouble arose, apparently from the presence of the intended 
victim, they were to use the tape provided by appellant to 
secure the victims hands and feet. The gloves were to be used 
to avoid leaving fingerprints (R. 1017-1020). 
After rejoining the others in the car, appellant 
asked if Smith had explained what the boys were to do. He 
then showed the boys a cap pistol which he said they were to 
use (R. 1022-1023). After this exchange, the car pulled away 
from the apartment, proceeding only a short distance down the 
street before it was stopped by a South Salt Lake Police 
officer (R. 1024). 
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While waiting to be questioned by the rulire, Mw;c, 
observed appellant shoving something into a fan grate locaterl 
in the latter's holding cell. Pol ire suhscqL1r>nt 1 y 
from the grate a business ca rel upon which th0 nam0 an,1 dcl i 1 , 
of the intenclecl victim were written (R. 
Appellant's prints were founcl on that carcl (R. 37fl). Finally, 
although neither of them knew the name of the intenclecl victim, 
Sisneros testified that they were to rob the home of an olcler 
woman (R. 611, 641-643). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
VERDICT OF ATTEMPTED BURGLARY AND 
ATTEMPTED ROBBERY. 
The issue in the present case concerns the 
interpretation of Utah's attempt statute, Utah Code Ann. 
76-4-101 ( 1953), which provides in pertinent part: 
(1) For purposes of this part a 
person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of 
culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in 
conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For the purposes of this part, 
conduct does not constitute a substantial 
step unless it is stongly corroborative of 
the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
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1\ppcl lnnt argues that his conduct did not constitute a 
,;tthstantial step toward the commission of the offenses of 
11 tc-111pted burglary and attemptec'l robbery. 
Utah's attempt statute is an adaptation of the Model 
''"! r'odc"s c'lefinition of attempt. See Model Penal Code 
c, s.ol. Thus, it is important to focus on interpretations 
given to Model Penal Code-type statutes, and not to rely 
heavily on common law distinctions between attempts and mere 
preparation, as appellant c'loes. Common law definitions of 
criminal behavior are not applicable in Utah, and where there 
is a conflict between the common law and this state's criminal 
code, the statutes are to be construed liberally. State v. 
Maestas, Utah, 652 P.2d 903, 904 (1982). 
The Moc'lel Penal Code's attempt statute was motivated 
by considerations of prevention. The drafters saw the need 
for a compromise position between the punishment of any 
suspect behavior and the curtailment of police action until 
the substantive crime had been committed. Their treatment of 
attempt was seen as "drawing the line further away from the 
final act," making the crime more one of purpose substantiated 
by an act strongly corroborative of that purpose. Moc'lel Penal 
Code§ 5.01 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). The emphasis is on 
what the actor has already done and not what remains to be 
done. Misner, "The New Attempt Laws: unsuspected Threat to 
the Fourth Amendment," 33 Stan. L. Rev. 201, 211 (1981). 
Actions which likely would fall on the preparation side under 
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the common law could easily estahlish an att<e>mpt und<>r the 
Model Penal Code: e.g., the gathering of to commit 
a crime, or the possession of certain instrum<•r1ts viith tt"· 
intent to use them in the commission of a hurglary. Iri • at_ 
211, 221. 
Thus, for purposes of attempt under Utah's statute, 
analysis must focus less on the nature of the defendant's 
activity standing alone and more upon whether that activity 
substantiates the intent to commit a crime. The hehavior nee 
not be incompatible with innocence; it need only be necessary 
to the consummation of the crime and such that a reasonable 
observer, looking at the behavior in context, could conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that it was undertaken with the 
purpose of violating the law. United States v. Manley, 632 
F.2d 978, 987 (2d Cir. 1980). 
Whether conduct represents a substantial 
step toward the fulfillment of a criminal 
design is a determination so dependent on 
the factual context of each case that, of 
necessity, there can be no litmus test to 
guide the reviewing courts. 
Manley, 632 F.2d at 988. The actual dividing line between 
preparation and perpetration (i.e., the determination of when 
an actor's conduct no longer constitutes preparation and 
becomes a substantial step toward the commission of the 
offense) is far from clear. Therefore, a review of several 
cases construing statutes following the Model Penal Code 
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formc1t will be helpful in determining whether appellant's 
"duct constituted a substantial step toward the commission 
''''Jlary and robbery.l 
In State v. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d 443, 584 P.2d 382 
(I the defendant had spent the evening drinking at a bar 
with some friends. On the way home, he and a friend decided 
to hold up a gas station. They parked in an alley behind the 
gas station and took a gun from the trunk. They also had a 
q un ny sack and stocking cap to be used as masks, They then 
hid in some bushes. At about 2:30 a.m., the gas station 
attendant decided to take a brief stroll. He caught sight of 
one of the defendants behind the phone booth. The attendant 
became suspicious and called the police. About this time the 
defendant and his friend decided not to continue, although 
they were unaware that the police had been called. As they 
were abandoning their hiding place, the police arrested them. 
The court sustained an attempted robbery conviction 
and held that a substantial step differed from the concept of 
an overt act in that it need only corroborate the actor's 
intent. Where the preparation ended and the attempt began was 
held to be a determination for the trier of fact based on the 
facts and circumstances of the individual case. The court 
It should be noted that some courts construing Model Penal 
Code-type statutes have reached rather extreme results on 
the question of what constitutes a substantial step. 
Compare Braham v. State, Alaska, 571 P.2d 631 (1977), with 
People v. Clerk, 68 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 386 N.E. 2d 630 
( 19 79). 
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stated that this standard was nirecterl to the rlef0ndant 's 
actions, which demonstrated a firm purpose to commit a crimA. 
This also allowed the police to intPrvenc lo prevent a crirrir 
when there was incriminating conrluct. 
United States v. Jackson, 415 F.Supp 411 IF.D.N.Y. 
1976), aff'd 560 F.2rl 112, cert. denied 434 U.S. 941 (1977), 
involved an interpretation of an attempt statute requiring th, 
same elements as the Utah statute. The defenrlant hacl entered 
into a conspiracy to rob a bank. The consrirators assemblea 
sawed-off shotgun, shells, masks and handcuffs. They also 
covered their car's licence plates with cardboard. The plan 
called for the conspirators to arrive at the bank early 
morning so they could enter with the bank manager anc1 relieve 
him of the weekend deposits. They arrived too late to effect 
this plan and postponed the attempt for a week. In the 
meantime, one of the conspirators was arrested on an 
charge and told the police of the robbery plan. 
The following Monday, the defendants clrove up and 
down the street in front of the bank several times. One of 
the group left the car, looked into the bank and then rejoined 
the group in the car. They macle several more passes in front 
of the bank, but after becoming suspicious that they were 
under surveillance, clecidec1 to abanclon the plan. While 
driving away, they were pursued by the police and 
susbseguently arrested for attempted bank robbery. 
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The court found that gathering the materials for the 
, nrn<nission of the crime, recruiting people to assist, and 
ri<iq the license plates with cardboard were all 
l '111tial steps which constituted an attempt. The court 
-.j>eCl f ical ly rejected the argument that the defendant had to 
near completion of the bank robbery. Nor was it necessary 
that there be any substantial progress toward that end. Any 
en•leavor which was corroborative of the actor's intent was 
sufficient to satisfy the legal requirements for attempt. 
"The fact that further major steps must be taken before the 
crime can be completed does not preclude a finding that the 
steps already taken are substantial." 435 F. Supp. at 438. 
As demonstrated by the cited authority and case law, 
the essence of an attempt is the existence of an intent to 
commit a crime, coupled with conduct strongly corroborative of 
that intent. Once the intent has been established, even 
slight acts that corroborate that intent constitute a 
substantial step. State v. Dale, Ariz., 590 P.2d 1379 (1979). 
Appellant does not contend that he lacked the intent to commit 
a burglary and/or robbery. His appeal is based solely on the 
sufficiency of his actions to constitute a substantial step. 
Accordingly, the inquiry is limited to whether his conduct was 
strongly corroborative of his intent. 
The trier of fact determines what constitutes a 
step. State v. Workman, 584 P.2d at 386. It is 
established that an appellate court will only overturn a 
ve nl ict challenged on insufficiency of the evidence "when the 
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evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a rea.snnable man 
could not possibly have reached a verclicl lH;ynnd ci rc>,1 sonah! 
doubt." State v. Mccardle, Utah, liS2 P.2cl 'l4/,'l4S (l'lfl2l. 
is the exclusive function of the jury to weiqh lhe credihi 1 i•. 
of the witnesses and the weight of tlH' evirlencP; that an 
appellate court might view the evidence cis less than wholly 
conclusive is not sufficient to overturn a verdict on appeal, 
state v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982). 
As the evidence at trial demonstrated, appellant 
provided the duct tape and gloves which co-defendant Smith 
explained to the juveniles, Moss and Sisneros, were to be 
to commit the burglary and/or robbery; the duct tape to tie ue 
the victim, if necessary, and the gloves to avoid leaving 
fingerprints. Appellant also provided the cap pistol for use 
in the crime. Finally, appellant was stopped by the police in 
a vehicle containing his co-defendant Smith, the two juveniles 
recruited to participate in the burglary and/or robbery, and 
items to be used in the commission of the crime. Just like 
the conduct in Workman, 58 4 P. 2d 38 2 (at tempted rob he ry of a 
gas station), and in Jackson, 435 F. Supp. 434 (attempted bani 
robbery), appellant's conduct was sufficient to constitute a 
substantial step and support his conviction for attempted 
burglary and robbery. Certainly, the evinence was not so 
lacking ann insubstantial that the jury could not conclune 
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had taken a 
substantial step toward the commission of the crimes chargen. 
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CONCLUSION 
This appeal requires an interpretation of UCA 
r. 4-101 (1953). The statute should be analyzed by the 
of the Model Penal Code requiring a substantial step 
anrl not the common law distinctions between preparation and 
attempt. A substantial step requires only that the actor's 
conrluct be strongly corroborative of his intent as determined 
by the circumstances of the case. The focus is not upon what 
has or has not been accomplished toward the commission of the 
offense, but on whether the actions corroborate intent 
Zickefoose v. State, Indiana, 388 N.E.2d 507 (1979). 
Appellant intended to participate in a burglary 
and/or robbery and his actions were designed to achieve that 
purpose. In short, his conduct constituted a substantial step 
and thus his conviction should be sustained. 
1983. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this of November, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
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